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This is the final paper in a series of four essays that deal with the 
political economy of armament and oil. Since the 1980s, military imports to 
the Middle East increased while revenues from oil exports declined 
substantially. These disparities highlight structural changes which affect 
the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large armament and oil companies. 
Relations between oil producing countries and petroleum companies were 
restructured and there was a surge in corporate concentration. A 'military 
bias' in Europe and Japan increased the global competition for military 
orders but also enhanced the cohesiveness of an emerging international 
armament lobby of military contractors. In addition, the domestic influence 
of the U.S. Armament Core was heightened by corporate concentration and 
symbiotic relations between contractors and the Pentagon. The two sides of 
the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition have consolidated their positions and 
may again seek to benefit from renewed cycles of armed conflicts and oil 
crises in the Middle East. 
Ceci est le dernier d'une serie de quatre articles traitant de l'economie 
politique des armements et du petrole. Depuis les annees 80, les 
importations militaires au Moyen-Orient ont augmente alors que les revenus 
des exportations de petrole ont diminue de facon substancielle. Ces 
disparites accentuent les changements structurels affectant la Coalition 
Armadollar-Petrodollar des larges compagnies d'armes et de petrole. Les 
relations entre les pays producteurs de petrole et les companies petrolieres 
furent restructurees, et i1 y eu Bmergence de concentration corporee. Une 
'tendance militaire' en Europe et au Japon accrut la competition globale 
pour les commandes militaires, mais aussi augmenta la cohesion d'un lobby 
d'armement international de contracteurs militaires. En outre, l'influence 
domestique du Noyau d'Armement aux Etats Unis fut accentuee par la 
concentration des corporations et les relations symbiotiques entre 
contracteurs et Pentagon. Les deux parties de la coalition Armadollar- 
Petrodollar ont consolide leurs positions et peuvent de nouveau chercher A 
bhngficier des cycles renouveles de conflits d'armes et crises de petrole au 
Moyen-Orient. 
Introduction 
In three earlier papers [Bichler et al. (1989), Nitzan et al. (1989) 
and Rowley et al. (1989)], we examined some major features of the political 
economy of armaments that had special significance in the age of oil crises. 
We argued that the growing dependency of large U.S.-based companies on 
foreign operations, coupled with their relative decline in civilian world 
markets, augmented a 'military bias' that was clearly discernible within the 
U.S. economy. Large U.S. corporations have increasingly shifted into weapon 
production and, during the 1970s, an 'Armament Core' of about 15 to 20 such 
corporations emerged to play a leading role in the evolution of the 'big 
economy' . A primary factor in their rise to prominence has been the growth 
of arms exports, particularly exports to the Middle East. The 'Era of Arms 
Exports ' began with the international redistribution of income that 
reflected the oil crisis of the 1970s. At the same time, the militarization 
of the Middle East (and the consequent armed conflicts that ensued) raised 
and maintained arms sales to countries in this region at record levels. This 
development led to the formation of an 'Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition' 
linking the large arms-producing corporations with their counterparts in the 
oil industry. Both groups of companies gained from the new relationship and 
had an interest in preserving the benefits that accrued from collaboration. 
Earlier treatment of the political economy of armaments has often 
focused on the economic and political structure in the United States. We 
added a further perspective in our previous three papers when we stressed 
the significance of some international aspects of corporate activity. In 
this final paper of our brief series on military spending, we examine new 
global changes which occurred during the 1980s and affected both the course 
of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the economic well-being of the 
Armament Core. The essay is divided into several parts. In the first of 
these parts, we deal with the instability of the Armadollar-Petrodollar 
Coalition. We begin by describing the disintegration of the OPEC cartel and 
the subsequent restructuring of relationships between petroleum companies 
and governments of the oil-producing countries. We also outline how the 
linkages between annadollars and petrodollars were affected by the Iran-Iraq 
war, which brought the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition to an important 
crossroads in its brief history. Finally, we assess how pursuit of this war 
revealed the new vitality of challenges to the supremacy of the U.S. -based 
Armament Core in Middle Eastern markets. 
Instabilities and challenges need not imply either the immanent demise 
of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition or the decline of the U.S. Armament 
Core. In the second part of our essay, we look further into structural 
changes that seem to be occurring in the oil industry and discuss the 
likelihood of a 'larger OPEC' emerging in the 1990s. Then, in the third 
part, we examine possible paths for the future evolution of western armament 
industries in light of recent changes in Europe, Japan and the United 
States. We also assess the potential for another round of rising arms 
exports in the coming decade. 
1.1 The Ailing OPEC: New Structural Cleavages 
The historical short-term development of the oil crisis during the 
1970s was contingent, to a large extent, on the inelastic nature of world 
energy requirements. However, the severity of oil-price increases served as 
an effective stimulus to the adoption of comprehensive measures to 
'conserve' energy throughout the industrial world. Improved energy 
efficiency and the onset of a worldwide recession in economic activity began 
to affect the oil market in 1980, when daily oil consumption started to fall 
from a peak of 65 million barrels that occurred in 1979. Daily consumption 
declined to a new level of 59 million by 1985. Since reductions in 
consumption were not matched by equivalent adjustments to supply, a glut of 
oil emerged with prices dropping continuously from $35 per barrel in 1981 to 
less than $15 in 1986 
Resistance by OPEC to this adversity was complicated by the actions of 
non-members of the cartel, which meant that the production of oil from the 
non-OPEC countries increased substantially. The share of OPEC in the world 
oil market thus slipped from 63 per cent in 1979 to 38 per cent only six 
years later. Initially, Saudi Arabia agreed to provide a 'cushion' for the 
oil revenues of other OPEC members by selling its own output at the cartel's 
official price and by adjusting its production to eliminate the pressure of 
excessive supply on this official price. Fulfilling this direct commitment 
in a situation of substantial glut meant that Saudi Arabia had to reduce its 
output from a level of 10.3 million barrels per day in 1981 to one of 3.5 
million in 1982 and, finally, to a mere 2 million in 1985. However, the 
Saudi Arabian action failed to stop the decline in prices. Eventually, 
failure was evident and the Saudi Arabian authorities reversed their stance. 
They increased output and the price of crude oil dropped below $10 per 
barrel in 1986. Disintegration of the cartel's 'ability to control oil 
supplies has drastically reduced the size of oil revenues. For example, the 
petrodollar earnings of Middle Eastern countries fell from $197 billion in 
1980 to $91 billion by 1984. Similarly, the aggregate net income earned by 
the 'Oil Six' (consisting of Exxon, Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum, 
Chevron, Mobil and Texaco) declined from a peak of $22 billion in 1980 to 
$15 billion in 1984 and, subsequently, to just less than $10 billion in 
1987. After a decade of cooperation based on growing petrodollar revenues 
and profits, the experience of shrinking income led to a renewed strife that 
affected the relationships between OPEC governments in the Middle East and 
the large oil corporations. 
The first indication of conflict occurred in early 1982, when Saudi 
Arabia established Norbec, a small Swiss trading company that bypassed 
ARAMCO and began to sell crude oil directly to refiners. The ARAMCO partners 
(Exxon, Texaco, Mobil and Chevron) had effectively controlled levels of oil 
output in Saudi Arabia for almost five decades with their role as principal 
buyers of this oil. These corporations were now faced, for the first time, 
with Saudi Arabian competition that threatened to eliminate the preferred 
access which they had previously enjoyed as partners. The action by Saudi 
Arabia marked the beginning of a new restructuring of world oil markets. 
During the previous upheaval of the 1970s, oil-producing countries had also 
challenged the power of the large oil companies. The countries assumed a 
leading role in the coordination of 'upstream' production activity but the 
oil companies retained their control over refining, transportation and 
marketing. The present turmoil, brought about by sharp price reductions in 
the early 1980s, induced the governments of oil-producing countries to 
venture into these downstream activities and again to challenge the s t a t u s  
quo of the industry. 
Kuwait was the country most affected by the subsequent restructuring. A 
state-owned company, Kuwait Petroleum, bought most of the European-based 
refining and marketing operations of Gulf Oil (after the latter merged with 
Chevron in 1984) and this Kuwaiti company now controls about 4,800 retail 
gas stations (48 brand) across Europe. Earlier, in 1981, Kuwait had acquired 
Santa Fe International Corporation (a big California drilling, engineering 
and oil-exploration company). This purchase signalled the beginning of a 
major shift of the country into exploration and production outside the 
domain of OPEC - -  by expansion of activities into the United States, the 
North Sea fields, Asia and ~ f r i c a . ~  The most dramatic move in Kuwait's 
policy of integration was launched in 1987, when the Kuwait Investment 
Office (KIO) took advantage of the sale by the British government of its 37 
per cent holding in British Petroleum and bought nearly 22 per cent of the 
oil giant's shares. Somewhat ironically, Kuwait became the largest 
shareholder of BP only 15 years after a situation of dependency in which 
half of the country's oil had been owned by the British company! The 
ownership 'coup' was so dramatic that the Thatcher government in the United 
Kingdom, which launched the sale as part of its privatization strategy, was 
surprisingly compelled to intervene and, in the name of the 'public 
interest', instructed KIO to reduce the size of its holdings in British 
Petroleum to an acceptable level of 9.9 per cent. KIO consented to fulfil 
the terms of the British government's decree but the incident reveals the 
potential scale of the persistent trend toward downstream integration, which 
was being pursued by most oil -producing countries. 
In 1988, Saudi Arabia concluded the largest Arab investment in the U.S. 
oil industry, when it paid $1.2 billion for a 50 per cent interest in the 
refining and marketing operations of Texaco in 23 U. S. states. Many other 
examples of integration can be cited: Abu Dhabi bought a 10 per cent stake 
in Spain's CEPSA and 5.5 per cent in France's Total; Libya bought Italian 
marketing and refining assets from Amoco and Texaco; Mexico acquired 34 per 
cent of Spain's Petroleos del Norte; and Venezuela entered into partnerships 
both with Southland's Citgo Petroleum and Union Pacific in the United States 
and with Germany's Veba Oel and Sweden's Axel Johnson Group in E ~ r o p e . ~  
1.2 Changing Winds in the Middle East Arms Market 
The second oil crisis of 1979-80 coincided with the outbreak of the 
Iran-Iraq War, which was to last eight years. Despite the dislocation of 
supply lines and other troublesome complications attributable to the armed 
hostilities, the subsequent collapse of crude oil prices was not deterred by 
the war. In some important respects, the situation that prevailed in the 
early 1980s differed from that following the Yom-Kippur War of 1973. The 
earlier war was' short and affected the oil market disproportionately by 
creating a 'crisis atmosphere' which facilitated price increases. Also, in 
1973, the formal alliance of Arab countries against Israel assisted OPEC in 
launching an oil embargo to pressure the government of the United States and 
other economic actors. By 1980s, however, the OPEC front was no longer 
united and two important members of the cartel were themselves military 
foes. The disturbances occurring in the Persian Gulf, particularly the so- 
called 'tanker war' and attacks on oil ports, aroused nervousness in the oil 
market and perhaps exerted a positive influence on oil prices. However, 
rivalry prevailed instead of cooperation and, with the prolongation of 
hostilities in the Gulf, the likelihood of reorganizing OPEC to restore its 
earlier cohesion diminished. The overriding need of both Iran and Iraq for 
new weapons and ammunition only intensified the oil glut with the two 
countries stretching their production to the limit in order to finance their 
war e f f ~ r t s . ~  The Iran-Iraq war thus created a new situation of falling oil 
prices, revenues and prof its amidst rising arms imports. This development 
meant that militarization in the Middle East no longer assisted the 
collective interests of the large oil companies and perhaps even began to 
undermined them. 
Beside inserting a discordant wedge between arms companies and their 
counterparts in the oil industry, the Iran-Iraq War also markedly altered 
the structure of the Middle Eastern arms market itself. As we indicated in 
Rowley et al. (1989), the early 1980s were the most lucrative years for 
companies exporting arms to the region.' Now, for the first time since 1967, 
the U.S.-based armament producers were losing ground to competitors from 
Europe, the Soviet Union and Third World countries.'* The loss of the 
Iranian market and the U.S. government's ban on arms shipments to Iraq 
effectively excluded U.S.-based arms producers from supplying the Iran-Iraq 
War, which proved to be the most expensive armed conflict since the Vietnam 
War.ll The gap created by the absence of the United States was quickly 
filled by suppliers from another forty countries, who often supplied both 
Iran and Iraq simultane~usly.~~ 
The Iran-Iraq War escalated tensions in the region and drew more 
moderate countries (such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates 
and Oman) deeper into the militarization process. These countries approached 
the U.S. government with pleas for assistance. The Reagan Administration, 
despite its own rhetoric calling for disarmament in the Third World, readily 
responded in a favourable manner but its practical efforts to provide 
military aid met resistance within the United States.13 Military deals with 
the 'third parties' might have compensated U.S. producers, at least 
partially, for their foregone sale revenues in the Iraq-Iran War. However, 
the interests of the Armament Core were generally not sustained when such 
deals were openly proposed. In 1981, President Reagan managed to override 
strong congressional opposition to the sale of five Boeing-made AWAX planes 
to Saudi Arabia but he was less successful with his subsequent proposal for 
Middle Eastern arms sales. For the first time, weapon deliveries that had 
executive backing were effectively blocked by opponents in the U.S. 
Congress. l4 A persistent deadlock between the Reagan Administration and 
Congress frustrated Gulf states, who responded by taking their demands for 
armaments elsewhere. Arms contracts were thus signed with the Soviet Union 
and West European producers. U.S.-based weapon companies suffered their 
strongest blow in July 1988, when negotiators from the United Kingdom signed 
the 'deal of the century' and undertook to supply Saudi Arabia with $25 
billion worth's of military hardware, construction and technical support 
over the next two decades. 15 
1.3 The Demise of the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition? 
The structural developments outlined in sections 1.1 and 1.2 raise 
several groups of interrelated questions, which are listed below. 
(1) The disintegration of the OPEC cartel disturbed the relationships 
that existed between Middle Eastern countries and the large oil companies. 
Will the attendant changes bring an end to the cooperation between the two 
sides? Is the world heading toward a prolonged era of low oil prices? Will 
the further shrinking of oil revenues bring an end to the 'Era of Arms 
Exports ' ? 
(2) The Iran-Iraq War increased the significance of the Middle East for 
some arms exporters but probably enhanced the downward tendency of oil 
prices. Did the large oil companies consequently lose their interest in the 
militarization of the Middle East? Will they cease to cooperate as political 
and economic allies of the armament firms? 
(3) Since the United States did not have a major role in supplying 
either of the belligerent countries in the Iran-Iraq War, the market share 
of U.S.-based arms producers declined relative to the shares of producers 
based in many other countries. This decline provided a self-interested 
reason for some U.S. producers to support efforts toward ending this 
particular war. Can we infer that this development signifies a general 
change in the overall strategy of the U.S. arms-producing companies with 
respect to their potential Middle Eastern markets? 
(4) The successful opposition within the United States to further 
militarization of moderate ('third-party') OPEC countries effectively 
undermined the interest that members of the Armament Core had in the 
promotion of such military sales. Does this political setback indicate a 
decline in the powerful leverage of the Armament Core? 
In addressing the complicated issues that are reflected in these 
questions, we cannot expect to provide definite historical predictions. 
Instead we must settle for a more modest programme of exploring the main 
currents of structural change and try to clarify the directions that might 
result from the active forces which can be identified. We begin with a look 
at the evolving situation of the oil industry. 
2. Toward a 'Larger Opec'? 
2.1 The 'Integrated' Oil-Producing Country: Friend or Foe? 
The current diversification of oil-producing countries into the 
downstream operations of marketing and refining has drawn objections from 
the large oil companies. However, such vertical integration may not be 
contrary to the companies' long-term interests. In many respects, the 
situation resembles that for the earlier structural conflict in the 1960s 
and early 1970s. The basic rationale for the emergence of the OPEC cartel in 
1960 was the inability of the 'Seven Sisters' to coordinate their own crude 
price strategies. Initially, the oil companies even struggled against 
restrictive measures adopted by OPEC but they eventually came to recognize 
the benefits that could accrue from an acceptance of the 'limited flow' 
principle, as promulgated by the cartel, and embarked on an era of 
cooperation [as we describe in Rowley et al. (1989)l. Interestingly, the 
later inability of OPEC to maintain or raise oil prices during the 1980s was 
again affected by a lack of cooperation among the large oil companies. The 
current process of restructuring the oil industry is directed, at least in 
part, to overcome the obstacle of inadequate cooperation. 
The source of current price instability can be traced to particular 
features of marketing practices. In terms of volume, most crude petroleum is 
sold through medium and long-term contracts, while only a smaller quantity 
is delivered through the immediate 'spot market'. In terms of price, 
however, the spot market has a pivotal role since the volatile spot price 
also affects the basic prices of new medium and long-term contracts. During 
the middle of the 1980s, excess global production amounted to a mere 5 per 
cent of the overall oil consumption of about 50 million barrels per day. The 
2.5 million barrels of daily overproduction were mainly channelled through 
the small spot market and thus exerted a powerful downward pressure on spot 
prices. Clearly the emergence of tensions from adverse price conditions had 
little to do with the operation of a mythical 'invisible hand' within an 
efficient market but rather stemmed from the inefficiency of large oil 
companies, when they failed to adequately 'manage' the spot market. Had they 
used their dominance in the marketing arena and pursued effective supply 
management, members of the 'Oil Six' could have taken advantage of the 
highly inelastic nature of global oil requirements. The companies might have 
maintained spot oil prices at their existing levels or, at least, slowed 
their decline. As we noted in Rowley et ale (1989), the well-being of the 
large oil companies is ultimately associated with high crude prices even 
though they have vertically-integrated operations. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the companies sought to bid down the price of crude oil that they purchased 
from OPEC countries and undermined their own broader interest. 
The lack of foresight revealed by the oil companies in the 1980s was 
not matched by strategists for the major oil-producing countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. When the latter strategists realized the 
significance of marginal trading for the spot market, they sought to acquire 
a larger role in the determination of spot prices. With their own marketing 
channels and refining operations, the large oil producers in the OPEC cartel 
could succeed where the oil companies failed. By altering their own spot 
sales to their downstream subsidiaries, the countries lessened the marginal 
'excess supply' and could even generate some degree of excess demand. In 
this way, their intrusion into downstream operations might stabilize the 
volatile marketing arena to the benefit of all producers, including the 
large oil companies. Any objections that the companies might advance to 
restrain such intrusions of the oil-producing countries into downstream 
activities can be further muted by other considerations. First, much of the 
restructuring has taken the form of joint ventures between individual 
governments and major companies that are already well-established within the 
industry. Second, with their involvement in similar vertical structures, the 
oil-producing countries and the major oil companies must share a consistent 
set of priorities. We suggest that such involvements and common interests 
provide a strong imperative for cooperation between the two groups once the 
present stage of restructuring is completed. The degree of this cooperation 
may be comprehensive rather than weak and fragmented. 
2.2 Industrial Stagnation and Corporate Concentration 
While the oil-producing countries were seeking vertical integration, 
the oil industry experienced a surge in corporate concentration. The U.S. 
economy has been affected by a wide stream of acquisitions and mergers since 
1975 and the oil industry was not isolated from the aftershocks of these 
structural adjustments or from the general climate of takeovers, financial 
raiders, and dramatic changes in ownership patterns. However, the 
consolidation of the petroleum industry that occurred during the 1980s was 
directly stimulated by the sharp decline of oil prices rather than by 
general movements in the economy. Large oil companies accumulated 
substantial cash hoards during the boom years of the oil crisis but the 
lower petroleum prices that occurred in subsequent years made their 
investment in exploration decreasingly lucrative. Thus, instead of replacing 
their oil reserves by exploring new fields, the major oil firms obtained 
them in Wall Street by acquiring reserve-rich rivals. During the 1981-1985 
period, there were 524 oil and gas-related mergers and acquisitions, which 
were valued at $77 billion. The number of these deals amounted to only 4 per 
cent of the economy-wide total but they represented about 17 per cent of the 
aggregate dollar value of all such transactions. l6 
Although some oil firms were acquired in diversifications by non-oil 
companies, the substantial flood of energy-related mergers was dominated by 
the oil-six companies and the outcome greatly enhanced their combined 
power.17 In 1984, Mobil acquired Superior Oil for $5.7 billion, Texaco took 
over Getty Oil for $10.1 billion, and Chevron concluded its $13.3 billion 
merger with Gulf Oil. In 1985, Royal Dutch/Shell acquired, for $5.7 billion, 
the remaining 30 per cent share of Shell Oil. British Petroleum purchased 
Britoil PLC for $4 billion and, in 1987, purchased the remaining 45 per cent 
of Standard Oil of Ohio's shares for $7.6 billion. Exxon, the world largest 
producer, spent $9.6 billion during the 1983-1988 period to buy back its own 
shares and, in 1989, purchased Texaco Canada for $3.8 billion. 
The grip of the Oil Six over the oil industry persistently tightened. 
Even with depressed prices, the Oil Six still earned an average annual net 
profit of $15 billion during the 1980s, more than any other comparable group 
within a single industry. Companies in other fields used their profits to 
diversify their activities but the large oil companies found difficulty in 
achieving similar diversification. For instance, Exxon's entry into office 
automation and electrical equipment and Mobil's acquisition of a retailing 
firm were abject failures. Even if these particular actions had succeeded, a 
wide drive by the Oil Six to diversify away from the troubled petroleum 
industry was infeasible. Byrne (1988) points out that if Exxon wanted to 
increase its earnings by just 10 per cent, it would have to acquire a 
company with $500 million in annual profits - -  in 1987, there were fewer 
than 75 such companies in the United States, many of which were oil 
companies. 18 
2.3 The New Cooperation to Come and the Next Oil Crisis 
The downstream diversification of oil-producing countries, their closer 
ties with the large oil companies, and corporate concentration within the 
industry all prepare the way for a future 'oil shock'. The prospects of such 
a crisis occurring are enhanced because cheap energy prices and the long 
economic expansion in developed countries have finally brought about 
increases in world oil consumption. At the same time, the prolonged 
reduction in exploratory activity caused non-OPEC production to peak in 1986 
so the share of OPEC in world output is once again rising. This shifting 
balance was made clear in early 1989, when non-OPEC producers offered to 
reduce their crude exports for the first time.'' Because of their smaller 
size, non-OPEC producers can hardly affect the market price by altering 
their production levels. During the 1970s, these producers were able to 
increase their output and revenues but, in 1987-1988, they were seriously 
harmed by the Saudi Arabian decision to flood the market with additional 
supplies of oil. The offer to cut non-OPEC exports is significant (even if 
the offer amounts to only 0.5 per cent of the present oil supplies from non- 
communist countries). More than an actual contribution toward regulating 
supply, the offer indicates a desire by non-OPEC countries to cooperate with 
OPEC governments, perhaps in the formation of a wider organization of oil- 
exporting countries. 
While the restructured oil arena may be susceptible to a new energy 
crisis in the near future, the occurrence of a crisis might depend on a 
major outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. Since oil consumption is 
so slow to respond to price changes, even a reduction of 5 per cent in oil 
production could be sufficient to create an oppressive atmosphere of 
'shortage* and to spark a price explosion. However, because of the 
substantial number of participants in this market and their mutual 
suspicions, the recognition of a common interest and its translation into 
coordinated actions may not occur unless some dramatic event stimulates 
attention. In view of this need for an effective stimulus, a Middle Eastern 
armed conflict may be an essential ingredient for the generation of the next 
oil crisis. 
There is a hazard of imprecision here. Middle Eastern wars were the 
instrument of oil crises rather than their cause. Global oil 'scarcity* has 
always been the result of a conscious decision to halt production rather 
than the consequence of either the physical destruction of oil installations 
- 16 - 
or the dislocation of primary shipping routes. Nevertheless, armed conflicts 
in the Middle East created the appearance of shortage, which the oil- 
producing countries and oil companies were unable to establish by other 
means. As long as oil remains the world's main source of energy and the 
Middle East remains the primary location of oil reserves, major oil 
companies are likely to continue their support for the militarization of the 
region. Thus the basic motivation for the Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition 
remains intact. 
3. Competition and Cooperation in the Global Armament Market 
3.1 A 'Military Bias' in Europe and Japan 
We noted in Nitzan et al. (1989) that the economic role of U.S.-based 
corporations had started to decline in civilian markets by the late 1960s. 
This decline spread to the global market for armaments by the early 1980s. A 
struggle over shares in this market, resulting from structural changes that 
occurred in Europe and Japan, first appeared in the Middle East and has now 
expanded to other areas. During the 1980s, European governments, 
particularly those of France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, 
supported massive arms shipments to the Middle East. The common arguments to 
explain the governments' actions were that such shipments secured oil 
supplies and that they assisted the 'recycling' of petrodollars. However, 
the zeal of these governments in pursuing arms sales has deeper structural 
roots. In our view, the zeal is merely a prominent sign of a growing 
'military bias' in these countries, similar to the one that occurred in the 
United States. 
During the late 1960s and 1970s, some large European and Japanese 
corporations were enlarging their shares of civilian markets at the expense 
of their American counterparts. This redistribution of economic activities 
meant that the European and Japanese companies could expand somewhat faster 
than their national economies. With the rapid increase of corporate 
concentration since the early 1980s, however, these firms outgrew the 
saturated civilian markets in which they operated. As a result, they also 
began to experience a lack of 'offsets' for corporate savings. The potential 
difficulty of excessive liquidity is illustrated by the entries of Figure 1, 
which rank 20 industrial corporations with respect to the size of their 
hoards of cash and marketable securities in 1987. The accumulation of such 
large sums of liquid capital indicates that these companies grew faster than 
their investment outlets. The difficulty is particularly acute for 14 large 
Japanese firms, who account for about two thirds of the aggregate value of 
cash and securities held by the 20 companies. As third-world conglomerates 
(such as Korea's Lucky Goldstar, Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai) became 
increasingly competitive, the incentive to invest in civilian activity was 
further reduced. Consequently, many of the large , European and Japanese 
producers followed the path taken by their American counterparts and turned 
to the defence sector as a primary sphere for their expansion. 
The progressive shift toward military production is well illustrated by 
the transformation of Germany's Daimler Benz from a car producer into one of 
Europe's largest military-industrial conglomerates. This transformation 
started in the middle of the 1980s, when NATO lifted a 30-year ban on German 
production of long-range weapons and thus set the stage for the 
consolidation of the German defence industry. In 1985, Daimler Benz had $24 
billion in sale revenues, 97 per cent of which came from the production of 
cars, trucks and engines. Within three years, as a result of a series of 
takeovers, Daimler Benz had $44 billion in annual sales revenues of which 
only 75 per cent came from its traditional activities in automotive 
production and over 10 per cent were obtained from defence-related sales. 
The diversification occurred because the company's automotive business was 
Figure 1 
TWENTY INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES WITH THE LARGEST AMOUNT 
OF CASH AND MARKETABLE SECURITIES (LESS INTEREST BEARING  DEBT)^ 
( $  billion) 
1. Toyota Motors 6. Nissan Motors 11. Nippon Oil 16. ~ r i d ~ e s t o n e ~  
2. Matsushita El. Ind. 7. Daimler Benz 12. Nippondenso 17. BASF Group 
3. Siemens 8. Boeing 13. Sanyo Electric 18. Fuji Photo Film 
4. Ford Motors 9. Kirin Brewery 14. Takeda Chemical 19. sonyC 
5. Hitachi 10. Toshiba 15. Honda Motors 20. I B M ~  
SOURCE: Rapoport (1988). 
a Figures for Japanese corporations represent parent company's assets only. 
Others are consolidated. 
Net cash before the $2.6 billion acquisition of Firestone in March, 1988. 
Net cash after the $2 billion acquisition of CBS Records in November 1987. 
The twentieth position is shared by IBM and Sharp, each with $1.5 billion. 
too p r ~ f i t a b l e ! ~ ~  During the early 19808, the company had accumulated 
several billion Deutsche Marks in cash but could find no profitable outlet 
for the use of these liquid assets in the mature car industry. Instead, the 
funds were redirected outside the industry to acquire the diesel and jet- 
engine producer Motoren-und Turbinen-Union, the electronics giant AEG and 
Germany's two largest aerospace producers, Dornier and Messerschmitt-Bolkow- 
Blohm. All four of the acquired companies were actively involved in the 
defence sector. 21 
The significance of these acquisitions may be far reaching. Daimler 
Benz is controlled by Deutsche Bank, which engineered the structural 
change. 22 Beside being Germany* s largest financial institution, Deutsche 
Bank exercises considerable influence on maj or companies in various 
industries, which include other defence c o n t r a c t ~ r s . ~ ~  Daimler Benz now 
controls about 40 per cent of Germany* s defence budget and, when backed by 
Deutsche Bank's financial clout, the conglomerate and its allies form a 
powerful Armament Core. Furthermore, Daimler Benz * s defence takeovers were 
actively encouraged by the German government, which is unlikely to withdraw 
support from the Deutsche Bank/Daimler Benz group. 24 
The 'military bias* at Daimler Benz may still be unique in its 
intensity but similar tendencies exist in other developed capitalist 
economies. Perhaps the most significant development in the shift toward 
military production occurred in 1985 when, for the first time since the end 
of the Second World War, the Japanese government bowed to pressures from 
large domestic corporations and agreed to increase its defence spending 
above the previous informal ceiling of 1 per cent of GNP. 25 With a 'military 
bias' now extending beyond the United States and into both Europe and Japan, 
the stimulus to international competition over world military budgets is 
clearly evident. 
In the struggle for larger shares of the world-wide armament markets, 
the competitors went beyond the Third World and entered the bidding for 
parts of the domestic budgets in their rivals' base countries. We illustrate 
this process with several examples related to (1) foreign bidding for major 
U.S. government contracts, (2) competition for European procurement, and (3) 
conflicts over the Japanese military buildup. 
The United States 
In 1986, the Fiat car manufacturer launched a campaign to persuade the 
Libyan government to sell its 15 per cent share of the company's conunon 
stock. This action came after the Pentagon cited the presence of partial 
Libyan ownership as the principal cause of its decision not to sign a 
contract worth $7.9 million with the company. Libya finally sold its stake 
in the company and the entire pattern of the Fiat ownership was restructured 
in a costly financial operation. 26 The incident is especially interesting as 
the overall value of both the foregone contract and Fiat's other contracts 
with the Pentagon was very small relatively to Fiat's annual sales, which 
amounted to about $18 billion in 1985, and did not appear to justify the 
turmoil.27 The puzzle of choices by Fiat's management may be resolved if we 
recognize that, during the middle of the 1980s, the company was caught in a 
dilemma that resembled the situation faced by Daimler Benz. After suffering 
severe losses for a decade, the company made a dramatic recovery and 
achieved record levels for its net profits in 1985 and 1986 (amounting to 
$884 million and $1.9 billion respectively). However, the size of the 
European car market only grew at an annual rate of 1-2 per cent and Fiat 
would need to make a heavy commitment to new investment in fixed capital if 
it wished to retain a competitive edge in this market. Instead, Fiat chose 
to diversify and one of its prime objectives was to enlarge its presence in 
the armament and aerospace markets of the United States, particularly in the 
programme for the Strategic Defence Initiative. 28 
Similar intrusions into the U.S. market for armaments were made by 
other European companies. During the early 1980s, France became the world's 
third largest arms dealer (after the United States and the Soviet Union) 
and, by 1984, French firms already sold more arms to the United States than 
their U. S . rivals sold to France. 29 Although their German counterparts 
anticipated some difficulty in getting Pentagon contracts for security 
reasons, all of Deutsche Bank's newly acquired firms submitted bids for 
participation in the Strategic Defence Initiative programme. 30 This 
programme also attracted interest from the major Japanese companies, who 
received their government's approval to participate in the competition after 
the policy reversal of 1985. In their pursuit of U.S. Defense funds, foreign 
companies also began to seek ownership of domestic U.S. military 
contractors. For example, in 1987, the large British armament producer, 
Plessey, submitted a bid to acquire the U. S. -based electronics conglomerate 
Harris Corporation. The attempt failed when the Pentagon objected to the 
takeover. 31 Plessey , however, continued to search for suitable acquisitions 
and, in 1988, the British company paid $310 million for Singer's 
electronics-systems division. This action raised the share of receipts from 
U.S. Defense contracts in the company's overall income from military sources 
to about 35 per cent.32 Other British firms are active here. In 1988, the 
'British invasion' saw $2 billion spent to purchase six U.S. military 
contractors. 33 Perhaps of more significance but relatively unnoticed at the 
time, Japan' s Nippon Mining acquired the defence contractor Gould for $1.1 
billion. 34 This was the first acquisition of its kind but, with the 
unprecedented levels for cash hoards of Japanese corporations, further moves 
by Japanese companies into the U.S. industry seem inevitable. 
Europe 
While resisting the growth of international competition for shares in 
the U.S. military budget, American companies face an uphill battle in the 
search for European and Japanese armament contracts. In 1984, the U.S. arms 
producers enjoyed a $1.8 billion trade surplus in military trade with their 
NATO counterparts but they were already finding new contracts much harder to 
obtain. The governments of France and West Germany, in that year, sought to 
protect their domestic firms from international competition when they signed 
an agreement to prohibit acceptance of the sole American bid to supply 
attack helicopter. To circumvent obstacles of this type, Bell Helicopter of 
Textron undertook a joint venture with Short Brothers of Northern Ireland to 
bid for Royal Air Force contracts, while Sikorsky Aircraft of United 
Technologies teamed with Dornier of West Germany (now a Daimler Benz 
subsidiary). Previous collaboration between American and European firms 
usually involved simple licensing arrangements but the current partnerships 
require the U.S. firms to undertake more substantial technical cooperation. 
A new atmosphere is prevalent. As a Vice-President of Bell Helicopter 
acknowledged: 'Without a partner, we wouldn't make any significant 
[European] sales in the future'. 35 
During the 1970s, General Dynamics and United Technologies were able to 
sell the F-16 aircraft to the European members of NATO by agreeing to 
manufacture the fighter-bomber in Europe. However, in the later 1980s when 
NATO is preparing for the aircraft's replacement, a similar arrangement is 
no longer sufficient. In 1987, a European consortium (which had 
participation from West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) 
drafted an agreement to build 1,000 new planes for a projected price of $30 
billion. Competition from U.S. companies for part of this effort was 
adversely affected by an insistence that no bids be allowed to include 
equipment subject to reexport controls. (Most of the military aerospace 
equipment from producers in the United States is subject to such controls so 
the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and its allies can 
be blocked.) The Europeans argue that the existence of such controls is 
unacceptable for they preclude exports of the new plane to non-NATO 
countries, effectively halving the size of potential sales. While the 
ultimate outcome of this policy divergence is unclear, it seems likely that 
the new European attitude will force some U.S. firms (such as Boeing, 
Honepel1 and General Electric) to establish even closer ties with their 
present European competitors if they wish to enter the contest for this 
aircraft business. 36 
The growing ties of large European and American arms companies was 
recently illustrated in a series of interrelated attempts to takeover or 
merge with competitors. These began in 1985 when G.E.C., a British company, 
bid for a smaller defence competitor, Plessey, but was rebuffed after the 
Thatcher government dissented on anti-monopoly grounds. 37 G. E. C . was not 
unduly discouraged and, together with Germany's Siemens, launched a second 
$3.1 billion bid for Plessey in 1988 - -  the first cross-border combination 
within the European defence market. Clearly the British company hoped the 
emerging pan-European climate, associated with the plan for comprehensive 
integration in 1992, would lessen previous antitrust objections. The 
partners sought to merge the defence operations of Plessey and Siemens into 
a new company in which both Siemens and G.E.C. would take a 50 per cent 
stake. If successful, G.E.C. would enlarge its share of the U.K. defence 
budget and, by separating the new company from its own defence operations, 
would remove the governmental concern over monopoly. Siemens, on the other 
hand, would gain support against the competition of its archrival in 
Germany, Daimler Benz. Furthermore, the companies would have access to their 
partner's base country and both might build on Plessey's U.S. operations to 
bid for American Defense contracts.38 The bid was immediately rejected by 
Plessey, which embarked on a 'Pack Man' strategy and joined an international 
consortium to prepare a reverse $12 billion bid for G.E.C. itself. 39 This 
aggressive retaliation was ultimately diffused in 1989 when a third party, 
the U.S.-based corporation General Electric, took advantage of G.E.C.'s 
plight and forced the British company to enter three joint ventures in the 
areas of medical equipment, electrical distribution equipment and consumer 
appliances. 
The entry of General Electric to this imbroglio was not surprising 
since the American corporation had earlier tried to attract partners to such 
ventures. When Plessey sought assistance in its reverse bid for G.E.C., 
General Electric seemed ready to participate but G.E.C. quickly recognized 
its weak position and acceded to the friendly cooperation of the joint 
ventures. 40 For General Electric, these ventures are more significant than 
the $2.6 billion of civilian revenues that they might generate. The process 
of concentration in the European defence sector is just beginning and U.S. 
firms need to find means of entry which will permit them access to future 
military contracts of the EEC. By establishing an effective working 
relationship with one of the largest European companies, itself active as an 
arms contractor, General Electric is taking a sensible step toward 
facilitating a later request to become one of the main players in the 
European arms industry, as well as making a move to a strategic position 
from which to launch further acquisitive raids and joint ventures. 41 
Japan 
Since the early 1980s, U.S.-based producers of armaments have faced a 
severe political dilemma, which stemmed from the desire of the Reagan 
Administration to make the United States' NATO and Japanese allies assume a 
greater share of the ' defence burden' and increase foreign military budgets. 
The U. S. government hoped, among other motivations, that the increases in 
military budgets would boost the levels of foreign military sales by 
constituent members of the Armament Core. However, this desired outcome 
failed to occur. Instead the policy intensified the 'military bias' of 
European and Japanese companies and stimulated their emergence as formidable 
competitors. Thus U.S. arms manufacturers were increasingly forced to choose 
between a secondary role in foreign markets or absence from the markets. 
Perhaps the best example of the potential results of this situation is 
provided by the conflict over the new Japanese jet fighter. 
In September 1985, the Japanese government decided to eliminate a self- 
imposed ceiling on military spending and it embarked on an ambitious five- 
year plan to spend $76 billion on defence projects. Caspar Weinberger, the 
U.S. Secretary of Defense and a persistent critic of the Japanese 'free 
ride' on defence, applauded the decision but his satisfaction with the 
apparent policy reversal soon turned to f r ~ s t r a t i o n . ~ ~  In November 1986, 
Japan disclosed a plan to replace 70 ageing Mitsubishi F-1 fighter-bombers 
that had been produced under U.S. licence. Instead of buying a more modern 
aircraft from either General Dynamics or McDonnell Douglas, Japan's Defence 
Agency announced its support for a new FSX fighter - -  to be domestically 
developed and produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and two Japanese 
subcontractors, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Fuj i Heavy industry. 43 Japan 
planned to order 100 of these new aircraft so U.S.-based companies stood to 
lose a potential order worth about $8 billion. An opportunity to challenge 
their exclusion arose in early 1987, soon after the disclosure that Toshiba 
Machine and Kongsberg Vapenfabikk (Norway's largest defence contractor) had 
illegally sold special tools to the Soviet Union, which reduced the noise 
made by their naval propellers. The U.S. Senate reacted swiftly to this 
disclosure and, in May of 1987, voted to prohibit Toshiba and its partner 
from selling any product in the United States for a period of two to five 
years. A month later, Weinberger visited Tokyo to convey the strength of 
congressional sentiment and the Japanese government responded by amending 
its plans. In October, the government agreed to use the F-16 of General 
Dynamics as the basis for the FSX design.44 Subsequently, the trade 
sanctions against Toshiba were weakened and a threat to block Japanese bids 
for the Strategic Defence Initiative programme was withdrawn.45 The first 
round of skirmishes over the FSX project was over but further disagreement 
was to follow. 
During the next year, defence officials of both countries sought to 
resolve the outstanding difficulties that plagued the tentative agreement. 
One public obstacle was the vigorous resistance displayed by some Americans 
to the idea of giving sensitive information on U. S. military technology to 
Japanese companies, who might become significant competitors in the long 
term. U.S. opponents of the deal (such as Clyde Prestowitz, a former trade 
negotiator, for example), estimated the Japanese companies would obtain 
major aircraft technology worth about $7 billion, in exchange for which the 
United States might expect just $500 million's worth of subcontracting work. 
Many American observers feared that the deal would provide Japan with the 
infrastructure to create a fully-fledged domestic aerospace industry by the 
middle of the 1990s. Editors of Business Week illustrated a popular view 
when they insisted in their issue for February 20, 1989, that the deal 
should be 'knocked out of the sky'. The real obstacle to agreement, however, 
was more prosaic - -  although Weinberger's successor as Secretary of Defense, 
Frank Carlucci, initialled the co-development agreement in June 1988, 
confirmation of its final terms was delayed by the inability of the two 
principals, General Dynamics and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, to divide the 
work between them. In January 1989, the dispute ended when the companies 
accepted a compromise by which 40 per cent of the development budget for the 
fighter project, which was worth $1.3 billion, would go to General Dynamics 
and the remaining 60 per cent to Mitsubishi Heavy I n d ~ s t r i e s . ~ ~  
Managers of the major U.S.-based corporations clearly understand their 
weak capacity to restrict the growing 'military bias' of their foreign 
competitors. They sought to 'position' their companies in favourable 
secondary roles when primary ones were infeasible. The president of General 
Dynamics, Herbert F. Rogers, insisted for example that his company 
participated in the FSX as an instrument of U.S. government policy but he 
also conceded that a primary goal of this policy was to tie the new Japanese 
aerospace industry to U.S. producers. 47 
The changing international status of U.S. arms manufacturers in some 
areas must be interpreted with care. First, such relative decline is not 
likely to lead to waning of global military spending. Somewhat 
paradoxically, the growth in global competition in the 1980s produced a 
concerted drive by military contractors to cooperate in an international 
armament lobby toward stimulating further militarization. Second, a common 
international perception of the need for a larger market preserved the 
global primacy of the U.S. arms manufacturers - -  given their privileged 
access to the world largest Defense budget, no other outcome was possible. 
Despite recent setbacks, the U.S. Armament Core retains its leading role in 
military markets. 
3.3 The Consolidation of the U.S. Armament Core 
The Armament Core exhibits an increasing degree of internal cohesion. 
Consolidation of the core is encouraged by the process of concentration 
within the U.S. defence industry and by the interdependence of the Pentagon 
with its main contractors. We briefly discuss each of these factors. 
Concentration at the Core . 
Concentration within the U.S. defence industry was affected by the 
pronounced shift in focus to larger and fewer major systems. To illustrate 
this shift, consider the changes affecting military aircraft. During the 
1950s, the U.S. aerospace industry built six new fighter aircraft for the 
Air Force but only two fighters emerged in the 1960s and two more fighters 
were developed in the 1970s. Looking forward, only one new model - -  the 
Advanced Tactical Fighter (AFT) - -  will be developed before the end of the 
century. A similar pattern was evident in orders from the Navy and Army so, 
not surprisingly, with fewer aircraft to build for the home country, the 
number of U.S. makers of combat aircraft fell from 14 during the 1950s to 7 
in the 1980s. 48 Individual military contracts became increasingly expensive 
and thus added the potential for destabilizing the industry. However, 
significant disruption only occurred in the 1980s, when their growth in size 
meant that new contracts were 'too big' for the financial well-being of even 
the largest U. S. companies. Through the 1990s, the Pentagon plans to spend 
$20 billion for two nuclear aircraft carriers (including escort ships and 
planes), $35 billion on 450 Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) for the Navy, 
$40 billion on 750 Advanced Tactical Fighters (ATF) for the Air Force, $60 
billion on the Army's Forward Area Air Defense System and $80 billion for 
132 Stealth Bombers for the Air Force .49 
The staggering size of such contracts upsets an orderly balance of 
separate competitive producers in the armaments industry. An unsuccessful 
bid for very large contract can imply bankruptcy so military contractors are 
being forced into joint ventures. Virtually all bidding for new large 
systems are now submitted by corporate teams. For instance, Lockheed, 
General Dynamics and Boeing collectively compete against the combination of 
Northrop and McDonnell Douglas for the ATF. Similarly Northrop, Grumman and 
LTV group their resources to challenge McDonnell Douglas and General 
Dynamics for the ATA; and Boeing and United Technologies compete against 
Textron and McDonnell Douglas for the proposed Army Attack Utility 
Helicopter (LHX). General Electric and United Technologies, who together 
form an effective aircraft-engine duopoly, now jointly produce two military 
engines. 50 
But collaborative activities and joint ventures alone were often 
considered insufficient for the sunrival of individual Defense contractors 
and additional strategies were sought. One alternative requires unethical 
conduct, perhaps bribery of government officials, in pursuit of desired 
contracts. 51 Legal alternatives involved acquisitions of rival contractors 
who were likely to obtain such contracts. This generally resulted in further 
concentration and the attendant changes in ownership patterns within the 
industry. The process can be illustrated in reference to the Pentagon's 
recent emphasis on defense-electronics and the associate trend of corporate 
acquisitions. During the brief period from 1985 to 1987, for example, there 
were over 30 defence-related mergers, many of which involved 'high tech' 
companies with electronics  operation^.^^ Most acquisitions were smaller 
contractors from the Armament Belt but a second round involving much larger 
acquisitions seems likely to follow. In 1986, Honeywell paid $1 billion to 
buy Sperry's aerospace business from Unisys and a year later Loral purchased 
Goodyear Aerospace for $640 million, while Lockheed took over Sanders 
Associates for $1.2 billion. 53 With these new acquisitions, Honeywell, Loral . 
and Lockheed - -  as well as other corporations such as Litton, Raytheon, E- 
Systems and Rohr Industries - -  are now in a favourable position to win 
defence electronics contracts, but this makes them likely candidates for 
takeover raids by the larger corporations in the Armament Core.54 Both Ford 
and Boeing (who have $9.4 billion and $4.2 billion respectively in liquid 
assets) are reputed to be looking for suitable electronics takeovers. After 
a decade of accumulation, these two companies and other contenders - -  such 
as General Electric, General Motors, Chrysler, General Dynamics and Roekwell 
International - -  should be able to bid some $5 billion to acquire Lockheed 
or other Defense contractors of similar size. 55 Acquisitions need not 
increase concentration in the defence industry if they are undertaken by 
outside firms, not preiriously involved in the industry. However, as the 
Pentagon commonly resists bids from 'outsiders', most defence-related deals 
are likely to continue being confined to industry insiders. Thus the 
concentration of the core will be enhanced. 
The Armament Core and National Security 
Observers often argue that symbiotic relations between the defence 
industry and government officials increase the 'self confidence' of arms 
contractors and make them decreasingly accountable. The 'revolving doorf-- 
with hundreds of corporate executives moving to the Pentagon and others 
migrating in a reverse direction from the armed forces and the Pentagon to 
corporate positions - - has created an 'old-boys network' of mutual 
interests. 56 However, during the 1980s, in the wake of numerous public 
inquiries into waste and fraud in defence procurement, a stronger expression 
of concern emerged. It became apparent that even if the government wanted to 
restrict the leverage exercised by the Armament Core, its power to do so was 
limited. 
In 1985, the Inspector General for the Pentagon, Joseph Sherick, 
revealed that 4 5  of the Pentagon's top 100 contractors were currently under 
investigation for possible criminal activities ! 57 Subsequently, in 1988, the 
government embarked on 'Operation Ill-Wind' which implicated most of the 
constituent corporations of the Armament Core in improper conduct. When the 
investigation began, President Reagan declared that 'waste and fraud by 
corporate contractors are more than a ripoff of the taxpayer - -  They're a 
blow to the security of our nation. ' Ironically, even when these 
corporations are convicted of criminal offenses, very little is done about 
the breaches of national security. Only three weeks after the Pentagon 
suspended payments to nine prominent Defense contractors under 
investigation, Secretary of Defense Carlucci resumed normal business 
relations with them, saying: 'My job is not to punish companies, my job is 
to protect the national security. '58 
The problem of inadequate governmental control and corporate misconduct 
is a direct consequence of both the growing size of large arms contractors 
and the Pentagon's virtual dependence on their output. An awkward situation 
prevails without effective sanctions. General Dynamics, for instance, has 
been under continuous attack for overcharging the government on various 
defence projects since 1971. In 1984, the company was subject to twelve 
separate investigations of such overcharging and numerous other criminal 
 allegation^.^' At no time during the entire period was General Dynamics 
barred from selected Pentagon contracts for more than a few months. The 
reason for this permissive behaviour is not hard to grasp - -  the company is 
the sole supplier of Trident nuclear submarines and one of only two 
manufacturers of 688-attack submarines; its F-16 fighter aircraft is the 
backbone of the Air Force; the M1 is the main tank for the U. S. Army and 
Marine Corp; and its Tomahawk cruise missile is a front-runner in the arms 
race with the Soviet Union. 60 
Many other large contractors benefit from a similar 'vulnerability' of 
the Department of Defense. The conflicting interpretations of 'national 
security' provided by Reagan and Carlucci often result in a partial 
government paralysis. It was revealed during the 1970s that Lockheed, while 
already operating under federal loan guarantees after overcharging the 
Pentagon by at least $1 billion on the C-5 cargo plane, bribed officials in 
the Netherlands and Japan to obtain foreign contracts. The only significant 
consequence of this revelation was the ousting of the company' s chairman, 
Daniel Haughton, and several other executives. Similarly, the only notable 
outcome of Northrop's foreign bribery scandals and illegal contributions to 
President Nixon's reelection campaign was the removal of chairman Thomas 
Jones from the presidency of the company - -  and he was reinstated a year 
later. 61 Clearly scandalous behaviour by company representatives rarely 
alters rank on the Pentagon's procurement list. The significance of company 
size is also demonstrated by the asymmetry of treatment accorded to 
different firms. When a small contractor from the Armament Belt is found 
guilty of fraud, punishment is commonly a prohibition from military 
contracts for several years. Often the miscreant suffers bankruptcy. In 
contrast, with a large contractor from the Armament Core, such punitive 
actions are perceived as a threat to national security, the government 
hesitates to accept self-inflicted pain, and avoids most disciplinary 
action. 62 
When members of the Armament Core become so large and influential, any 
attempt to reform the U.S. Department of Defense's procurement process and 
to check rampant mismanagement is unlikely to succeed. At the outbreak of 
the current wave of scandals, the Reagan Administration named David Packard, 
a former Deputy Defense Secretary and chairman of the defence contractor 
Hewlett-Packard, to head a new Commission on Defense Management. Packard, 
who was described as the 'unofficial chieftain' of the military-industrial 
complex that he was to reform, recommended the creation of a new post-- 
Defense Under Secretary for Acquisition - -  which would centralize all 
procurement authority. 63 Caspar Weinberger , as Secretary of Defense, 
nominated a former colleague at Bechtel, Richard Godwin, to fill the 
position but resisted the granting of effective power to the new 
incumbent. 64 However, the new under-secretary set up a comprehensive 
computer system to follow the progress of major systems as being developed 
by the various armed services - -  seemingly, the first attempt to create a 
database that would support an effective centralized analysis of defence 
spending in the United States. These initiatives displeased many in the 
defence arena and Deputy Defence Secretary William Howard Taft IV flatly 
announced: 'There aren't any czars in Washington, and it was probably 
misleading to tell Godwin he would be one.' Godwin resigned in September 
1987 after only one year at the helm of the surveillance process. Frank 
Carlucci, Weinberger's successor, replaced Godwin by Robert Costello, who 
had served for six years as the chief procurement executive for the fifth 
largest U. S. Defense contractor, General Motors. The status of the computer 
system evaporated as the earlier policy of consensus and unequal symbiosis 
returned to replace this modest confrontation with the Armament Core. 65 
Regulation of the activities of the Armament Core is impossible without 
a comprehensive reappraisal of the U.S. armament policy and the 
profitability of arms production. In 1985, the Pentagon released a study 
that indicated military contractors had obtained an annual rate of return of 
4.7 per cent on their equity between 1980 and 1982, while comparable 
durable-goods manufacturers in the civilian market suffered a loss of 3.6 
per cent!66 Two years later, the General Accounting Office (GAO) responded 
to this information and other allegations of excessive profits by 
recommending the establishment of a special Executive Branch office to 
monitor contractors' earnings. Like their counterparts, the electrical and 
communication utilities, the giant military contractors were viewed as 
enjoying a strong oligopolistic (sometimes monopolistic) position in a 
highly sensitive industry and thus should be subject to a similar system of 
regulation. 67 The contractors quickly contended that earnings ' regulation 
would unfairly expose confidential aspects of their civilian operations and 
interfere with their activities for the Defense Department. The GAO's 
recommendation was not implemented. 
Our findings on the global armaments industry are straightforward. A 
significant change in structure occurred during the 1980s. First, the 
emergence of 'military bias' in Europe and Japan created strong competition 
in world markets but eventually consolidated the international armaments 
industry and created a common interest to link U.S. producers and their 
foreign rivals. Second, although the Armament Core in the United States 
suffered particular international setbacks, its members retained their 
global pivotal role and fortified their leverage within the United States. 
Given the accuracy of this assessment, the question to be addressed now is 
how these developments will affect the future of global military spending. 
Will domestic military spending in the United States, Europe and Japan be 
sufficient for their separate armament cores to sustain their past rates of 
growth? Are there alternative investment outlets for these military 
producers? What will be the future role of military exports? We tentatively 
consider these questions in the following section. 
3.4 Arms Exports: Is There an Alternative? 
Although defence industries grew rapidly throughout the 1980s, they may 
face serious difficulties in the 1990s. Their adversity may not stem from 
either internal conflicts or competitive pressures but rather from a crisis 
in their ability to find sufficient 'offsets to savings'. The potential 
problem for U. S. arms corporations is suggested by the graphs of Figure 2, 
which show the annual growth rates for domestic military spending (excluding 
employee compensation) and for the GNP of the United States since 1967. Two 
broad periods can be discerned. For much of the first decade, GNP grew 
faster than military spending but after 1978, a reversal can be seen with 
military expenditures expanding faster than the economy as a whole. The 
entries of Table 1 take up this differential between growth rates and add 
information on the experience of the Armament Core. We represent this 
experience by average annual growth rates for nine of the largest Defense 
contractors - -  General Dynamics, General Electric, McDonnell Douglas, 
Rockwell International, Lockheed, Raytheon, Boeing, United Technologies, and 
Grumman. [Our exclusion of General Motors, the fifth largest Defense 
contractor, is explained in Nitzan et al. (1989).] 
In the first period from 1968 to 1978, military spending grew at an 
average annual rate of 3.3 per cent, with declines actually occurring in the 
Figure 2 
ANNUAL RATES OF CHANGE IN U.S. GNP AND MILITARY SPENDING~ 
(percent) 
SOURCE: Citibase, Citibank Economic Database [Machine-Readable Magnetic 
Data File, 19861 (New York: Citibank, N.A. 1978), p. X-1-1, Table 
1.1, series GNP and p. X-3-3, Table 3.7b, series GGFEN and GGFNC. 
a Original figures are in current dollars. Data for military spending 
Exclude compensation of employees. 
Table 1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF SELECTED U.S. INDICATOR+ 
(percent) 
SOURCE: Military spending and GNP data are from Citibase, Citibank 
Economic Database [Machine-Readable Magnetic Data File, 19861 (New 
York: Citibank, N.A. 1978), p. X-1-1, Table 1.1, series GNP and p. 
X-3-3, Table 3.7b, series GGFEN and GGFNC.; Sales Revenues data 
are from Standard & Poor's Compustat Senrices (1986) Industrial 
Compustat, Compustat II/130-Item Annual Magnetic Tape; 'The 





a Original data are in current dollars. 















sub-period 1969-1973. This growth performance consistently lagged behind the 
corresponding rates for GNP, which averaged 9.3 per cent. Sales revenues of 
the Armament Core in these years rose by an average rate of 8.8 per cent. As 
we argued in Rowley et al. (1989), the companies of the Armament Core were 
able to grow faster than domestic military spending because of rapid 
advances in military exports. In the second period from 1979 to 1986, the 
situation was markedly altered. While nominal GNP grew by an annual average 
of 8.2 per cent, the expansionary policies of the Reagan Administration 
increased military spending by 16 per cent per year. The corporations of the 
Armament Core expanded much faster than the economy as a whole, with sales 
growing at an average yearly rate of 12.3 per cent. 
This spectacular growth of the Armament Core's revenues raised profits 
by an annual rate of 11 per cent:68 The large military contractors easily 
reinvested their higher earnings since defence spending grew by an even 
faster rate of 16 per cent. The question to be asked, of course, is how long 
this situation can be maintained? A deceleration of some differentials is 
evident from Figure 2. While military spending grew faster than GNP, the 
rates of increase in military spending consistently fell after 1980. The 
current concern over hugh governmental deficits in the United States is 
widely based and so, despite attempts by the Bush Administration to shield 
the Pentagon from severe budget cuts, restraint seems imminent. Even if the 
'largest defence buildup in peace- time' continues, the growth rate of 
domestic military spending is most likely to continue its decline. 
Consequently, large Defense contractors face a future in which there may be 
a severe shortage of offsets to their savings. 
Similar problems may afflict military producers in other countries. To 
clarify potential developments, consider the two graphs of Figure 3, which 
show constant-dollar levels of military spending in the United States and 
the aggregate levels of domestic military spending by other NATO governments 
for the period from 1974 to 1984. In the United States, 'real' military 
spending rose after 1976 but, from 1981 onwards, the rate of growth 
diminished. (Note the use of a logarithmic scale for our graphs.) By 
contrast, constant-dollar military spending in Europe grew at a stable rate 
throughout the entire 1974-1984 period. However, growth was modest at an 
average annual rate of 2.1 per cent and persistently lagged behind the rapid 
expansion of European armament producers. With a continuation of the 
favourable climate toward disarmament that has been induced by dramatic 
changes in Soviet Union, actions by governments in NATO countries will not 
reverse these historical trends. Another arms race seems unlikely to occur 
under such circumstances. Instead, most governments may be pressed to reduce 
levels of military spending. All this comes at a time when large 
corporations exhibit a strong 'military bias' and are increasing 'in need' 
of such spending. Furthermore, the global consolidation of military 
industries has stabilized relative market shares and seems likely to 
preclude substantial redistribution among major corporations. Thus, in the 
absence of a major world conflict, the large military contractors must look 
elsewhere for additional investment outlets for their profits. 
One potential area for investment might be provided by an extension of 
the new 'frontier' that links civilian space exploration with commercial 
DOMESTIC MILITARY SPENDING BY NATO COUNTRIES 
($  billion, 1983 pricesa) 
Year 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r a c t  of t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s :  1988 ,  Table 517, p. 318. 
activity. This market, which is already dominated by large Armament-Core 
corporations, has been growing very rapidly in recent years and the U.S. 
administration is struggling to reconcile the functioning of the National 
Aeronautic Space Agency (NASA) with efforts to secure further private 
business for the large aerospace c o n t r a ~ t o r s . ~ ~  Similar growth is visible in 
Europe, where the European Space Agency (ESA) has recently embarked on a 
substantial space programme, which is worth $34 billion and will extend over 
12 years. Most of the programme's resources will be allocated to major 
European aerospace firms - -  such as Aerospatiale and Dasault in France, 
Daimler Benz in Germany, and Aeritalia in Italy.'O However, while civilian 
space contracts could be significant for individual corporations, they 
cannot resolve the overall difficulty arising from the stagnation of defence 
spending. The reason for this view is illustrated in Table 2, where we 
provide outlay figures for both the U.S. Department of Defense and NASA. The 
third column of the table shows that defence outlays are presently almost 40 
times larger than NASA's expenditures. Hence, in order to compensate for a 1 
percentage point of foregone military spending, NASA has to increase its 
outlays by almost 40 per cent. Unlike military spending which can be often 
be justified by the imperatives of national defence, large levels for 
civilian space expenditures are much harder to institutionalize and, 
therefore, any increases of this order are highly improbable. 
Another potential area for new investment by the large military 
contractors is provided by government megacontracts to establish civilian 
high-technology systems. In the United States, for instance, such orders 
currently account for 5 per cent of the joint computer hardware and software 
T a b l e  2  
FEDERAL BUDGET OUTLAYS 
SOURCE: U.S.  Bureau o f  t h e  Census ,  S t a t i s t i c a l  Abstract  of the United 
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Department 
o f  Defence 
( $  b i l l i o n )  
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1 7 0 . 7  
1 9 8 . 7  
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( 2 )  
NASA 
($  b i l l i o n )  
3 . 8  
3 . 3  
5 . 0  
5 . 5  
6 . 2  
6 . 9  
7 . 1  
7 . 3  
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1 : 2  
22 .2  
2 8 . 5  
29.2  
3 1 . 0  
32 .0  
3 2 . 4  
33 .9  
36 .2  
38.6  
7 . 9  3 7 . 4  
markets. 71 Future U. S. contracts include a government phone system and an 
air-traffic control system, worth about $25 billion and $5.6 billion 
r e ~ p e c t i v e l y . ~ ~  For the winners - -  chosen among competitors such as AT&T, 
Martin Marrieta, US Sprint, IBM, and General Motors - -  these contracts could 
be highly important but, again, the overall size of the market is likely to 
remain quite small relative to that for military products. 
A third outlet for savings of Armament-Core companies is provided by 
financial activities. Between 1984 and 1986, Chrysler Financial Corporation 
tripled its assets to $15.9 billion and Ford Motor Credit Corporation 
doubled its assets to $31.3 billion but the expansion of both companies is 
small relative to that of General Motors Acceptance Corporation, which had 
$75.4 billion in financial assets by 1986. Chrysler's chairman, Lee 
Iacocca, accurately summarized this change: 'We are no longer just a car 
company, [we] are a major financial institution. ' 73 Even more dedicated 
military contractors (such as General Electric, General Dynamics, and United 
Technologies) have large and rapidly-growing financial subsidiaries. A 
similar conglomerate integration of financial and military operations 
occurred in Europe and Japan. Looking forward, the present attraction of 
financial investment will diminish if growth in financial markets is 
reduced. These markets have grown rapidly throughout the 1980s and a further 
increase in the pace of growth seems unlikely. Furthermore, recent growth in 
this area was, at least in part, induced by government borrowing to finance 
defence-related deficits and so a reduction in military spending may also 
adversely affect the financial sector. 
Civilian space exploration, non-defence governmental megacontracts and 
financial activity will surely serve to provide some partial compensation 
for the losses due to stagnation of domestic defence spending within 
developed capitalist countries. However, the most promising potential for 
dealing with the anticipated shortfall in the 1990s must seem to arise from 
further arms exports to third-party countries . Figure 4 illustrates the 
temporal pattern of aggregate arms exports by the NATO countries from 1975 
to 1985. Indeed these exports have stagnated since the early 1980s. The 
promise military exports stems precisely from this present stagnation. 
While civilian space exploration and financial services are already growing 
rapidly and are unlikely to expand at even faster rates, the current 
situation of stagnating arms exports has ample room for more growth. As 
illustrated in Figure 5, the potential for such growth is particularly 
concentrated in the Middle East and Africa. Since the beginning of the 'Arms 
Exports Era' in 1972, the combined'value of military shipments to these two 
regions has grown at an average annual rate of 21 per cent - -  more than 
twice the pace of arms exports to the rest of the world, which expanded at 
an average rate of just 10 per cent. We argue in Rowley et al. (1989) that 
much of this expansion was boosted by the oil crisis. When the oil revenues 
of Middle Eastern and African producers plunged during the 1980s, arms 
exports to these regions stagnated. However, despite the current depression 
in oil prices, the Middle East and Africa still demonstrate a strong 
appetite for military hardware and they absorb about half of world military 
transfers. A new oil crisis, if it were to occur, would fuel a wave of 
rearmament expenditures and substantially increase their military imports. 
If arms exports into the Middle East and Africa again increase at a yearly 

Figure 5 
ARMS IMPORTS BY WORLD AREAS 
( $  billion) 
Year 
SOURCE: U.S. Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency, World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, various years. 
rate of 20 per cent,  they could quickly reach an annual l eve l  worth more 
than $50 b i l l i o n  to  generate ample new orders from the principal arms 
suppliers. 
4. Epilogue 
We sought to provide a simple narrative that describes the evolution of 
armament and oil industries. Use of some convenient terms such as 'the 
armament core', 'military bias', 'the armadollar-petrodollar coalition' and 
'offsets to savings' permitted us to focus on very significant trends in the 
nature of trading relationships, structural characteristics of the 
industries, the role of governments and their symbiotic interaction with 
large corporations. Our account is quite different from the common 
macroeconomic treatment by many economists because we stress the need to 
identify the principal economic agents that are active in determining how 
the markets will evolve. We use anecdotes and individual actions of both 
companies and governments to advance our story, which removes the simplicity 
of macroeconomics, but our objective is not to stay mired in the traditional 
conventions of business chronologies. Instead our concern is with the world ' 
economy - -  that is, with aggregate developments in the Middle Eastern 
region, the United States, Europe and elsewhere as they affect the two 
industries. 
Given an acceptance of this methodological compromise, the recent 
history of the two industries emerges with clarity and meaningful inferences 
about future developments are possible. The relative power of the principal 
economic and political actors has to be recognized or most predictions are 
vacuous - -  since we live in an environment being transformed by a rush 
toward increased structural concentration for the control of economic 
activity. This global process is especially evident in the markets for oil 
and armaments. Thus the alternative macroeconomic perspective offers only 
sterility and obfuscation in the context that we have investigated. 
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7. See Bluestone et al. (1988). 
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arms to both sides of the conflict and, in 1987, agreed to supply Iraq with 
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the overall stake of U.S. -based companies in direct supplies of armaments 
remained small. 
12. The prime suppliers of armaments for the war were based in France, the 
United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, South Africa, the Soviet Union, China, 
Vietnam, Israel and Brazil. Iraq even supplied Iran - -  after 150 Iranian M- 
48 tanks (and cannon shells made by Chrysler) were captured in 1982, the 
Iraqi forces were unable to operate them so they were sold and eventually 
returned to Iranian hands in 1986! 
13. The ambiguity of the administration's statements and actions is clearly 
expressed in contemporary documents and proposals. Lewis (1988), for 
example, reports an address by Secretary of State Shultz to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in which Shultz declared that 'developing 
countries must help reduce the international tension and ease the arms 
race.' This statement was made only one month after the Reagan 
Administration proposed to increase U.S. arms exports by $3.3 to a level 
exceeding $15 billion in 1988 - - with proposed shipments worth $3.6 billion 
to Israel, $2.7 billion to Egypt, $950 million to Saudi Arabian, and $1.3 
billion to other Middle Eastern countries. See 'Arms Sale Just a Proposal 
U.S. Says' in The Montreal Gazette of May 3, 1988, p. A12. 
14. In 1985, the U.S. Congress refused to approve the sale to Saudi Arabia 
of 40 advanced F-15 aircraft (manufactured by McDonnell Douglas) and, in the 
following year, blocked the sale of 800 Stinger missiles (produced by 
General Dynamics). In 1988, the U. S. Senate voted to deny a Kuwaiti request 
for Maverick missiles and also forbade the sale of Stinger missiles to Oman. 
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15. See Maremont, Comes, Peterson and Melamed (1988). 
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17. Acquisitions by non-oil companies included, for example, the takeover 
of Conoco by Du Pont and the movement of Marathon Oil to the ownership of 
USX (then U.S. Steel). 
18. These structural factors which operate toward further consolidation of 
the oil industry do not mean, however, that the petroleum giants are 
compelled into such concentration drive against their will. The energy 
sector is a 'key industry' which crucially affects the course of the world 
economy and officials of the large oil companies need not read Veblen (1923) 
to grasp the economic leverage provided by this pivotal position. Despite 
current difficulties, officials like Exxon's chairman and chief executive 
officer, Lawrence G. Rawl, remain highly optimistic: 'Energy is the biggest 
business in the world . . . I mean really big. It is inconceivable to me that 
20 or 50 years out we still won't need at least as much energy . . .  Energy is 
here to stay.' See Byrne (1988). 
19. See Butler (1989). 
20. See Ingersoll (1985). 
21. In 1984, before its merger with Daimler Benz, Messerschmitt-Bolkow- 
Blohm paid $2.5 billion to purchase another defence contractor, Krauss- 
Meffei, which came from the dismembering of the Friedrick Flick group-- 
previously the largest privately-owned holding company in Germany. See 
'Forging a Deal to Create a New Giant in Defense' in Business Week of August 
20, 1984. Also see Graff (1988). 
22. See Ingersoll (1987). 
23. See Templeman e t  a l .  (1988). 
24. The official explanation of the German government for its support 
suggested that the consequences of such diversification would help to close 
the ' technological gap' with the United States and would permit a sensible 
rationalization of the aerospace sector. The net effect was to consolidate a 
military-industrial-financial combine that may become a 'government within 
government'. Again see Ingersoll (1987). 
25. See 'Upping the Ante on Defense' in Time for September 30, 1985, and 
the coverage provided by The Financial Post for September 27, 1986. 
26. The Agnelli family spent $1 billion to increase its share of Fiat from 
32 per cent to 40 per cent, while the remaining 7 per cent acquired from 
Libya (which was underwritten by Germany's Deutsche Bank and Italy's 
Mediobanca for $2 billion) was sold to institutional investors. See 
'Dropping Out' in Time for October 6, 1986, p. 68, and Symonds (1986). 
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$23.6 million. See Pedrick (1986). 
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(1987). 
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38. See Maremont and Schares (1988). 
39. See Maremont (1989). 
40. See Norman (1989) and Quint (1989). 
41. European governments, of course, do not welcome U.S. takeovers 
affecting their defence sectors. Legislative barriers to limit intrusions 
have been common. For example, when British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce were 
privatized, their articles of association required foreign ownership to be 
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43. See Usui and- Griffiths (1986). 
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Dryden and Armstrong (1988) and Sanger (1989) for later comments. 
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46. See Sanger (1989). 
47. See Dryden and Gross (1988), Sanger (1989) and Rogers (1989). 
48. See Toy e t  a l .  (1988). 
49. See Griffiths (1987b) and Church (1988). 
50. See Toy (1987a). 
51. The U.S. defence industry has been plagued by a host of criminal 
scandals but the scale of recent contracts probably encouraged additional 
incidence of scandalous behaviour. In 1988 alone, allegations were made 
against as many as twenty Defense contractors in what has been termed 'the 
biggest inquiry into white-collar crime in history'. See Toy e t  al. (1988). 
52. See 'Pickens Picks: A Boone for Investors?' in Fortune for September 
14, 1987, pp. 126 ff. 
53. See Pitzer (1988) and 'Pickens Picks ... '  (ibid.) 
54. See Toy (1987a). 
55. See Toy (1987b) and Marcia1 (1989). 
56. Se'e the accounts by Reed (1975) and Adams (1982). 
57. See Payne (1985). 
58. See Bock (1988). 
59. See Payne (1984) and Ellis et al. (1985). 
60. Our summary is based on Moody's Industrial Manual, General Dynamics 
Corporation, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 366-74. 
61. See Ellis et al. (1985). 
62. The consequences of government hesitations and resulting policy 
ambivalence were illustrated when in 1987 the Justice Department dropped its 
fraud case against General Dynamics and its former executive James M. Beggs. 
Quoting Winston Churchill, Beggs confirmed that 'nothing in life is so 
exhilarating as to be shot at without result.' See Fortune, for July 20, 
1987. 
63. See Fitzgerald (1989) and Griffiths (1989). 
64. See Wildstorm (1987). 
65. When he assumed his new government position, Costello explained his 
disapproval of Godwin's 'Big-Brother style' computer by arguing that his was 
a 'policy job' quite removed from 'nitty-gritty' details. See Van Voorst 
(1988). 
66. See 'A Delicate Pentagon Probe' in Time of August 19, 1985. 
67. See Griffiths (1987a). 
68. Our calculations use data sources that are listed in Table 1. For 
detailed data see Bichler et al. (1989), Table 2. 
69. In 1988, for example, the Congress forced NASA to guarantee $700 
million in leases on a future space platform to be built by Space 
Industries, a consortium of Westinghouse and Boeing. NASA considered the 
platform as superfluous capacity in view of its own plan for a $20 billion 
space station. Nevertheless, officials in the Reagan Administration 
applauded the decree as a valuable means of privatization of space-related 
activities. See Payne (1988). 
70. See Peterson (1987). 
71. See Seghers and Lewis (1987). 
72. See 'Anyone Want to Bid on Revamping the Bidding Process' in Business 
Week of August 29, 1988, p. 33. 
73. See 'Auto Bankers' in Time of May 26, 1986. 
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